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Assumption of Risk: An Age-Old Defense
Still Viable in Sports and Recreation
Cases
Alexander J. Drago*
INTRODUCTION
The phrase “assumption of risk” often causes confusion within the
legal community because it has several different meanings and is
often applied without recognition of these differences.1 Conduct
amounting to contributory negligence is sometimes mislabeled as
assumption of risk. The distinction between these two defenses,
once largely irrelevant because both completely barred recovery, has
been redefined to allow the notion of assumption of risk to remain a
viable defense even with the advent of modern comparative fault
concepts.
Generally, the defense of assumption of risk can be used when a
plaintiff (professional or amateur) voluntarily engages in an athletic
or recreational activity involving open and obvious risks. The ice
skaters, baseball players, or lacrosse players who voluntarily engage
in those sports, and expose themselves to the open and obvious risks
involved therein, may have their actions dismissed under this
doctrine. Likewise, concert attendees who flail wildly in the mosh
pit2 or performers who dive into the audience from the stage may
also have their action dismissed under the right set of facts.
The Restatement of Torts (Second) section 496A defines the
general principle of assumption of risk as follows: “A plaintiff who
voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or
*

Alexander J. Drago, a 1981 graduate of Fordham University School of Law, practices law
in New York and New Jersey. His practice includes representation of professional and
amateur leagues and teams along with sport sanctioning organizations, organizing
committees and athletic and recreational venues.
1
Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 861 F.2d 502, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1988).
2
“Mosh pit” is a term for a relatively new phenomenon in which concert attendees
congregate in an area near the front of the stage and engage in various types of wild
gyrations, such as body slamming.
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reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for such harm.”
The comments to section 496A of the Restatement of Torts (Second)
identify four meanings courts have given assumption of risk.3
Comment (c)(1) states that assumption of risk applies when a
plaintiff has given his express consent to relieve the defendant of any
obligation to exercise care for the plaintiff’s protection. The
defendant, who otherwise would have a duty to exercise such care, is
relieved of that duty.
Comment (c)(2) lends another meaning when the plaintiff has
voluntarily entered into some activity that he knows will involve
some risk, and thereby has impliedly agreed to relieve the defendant
of any duty, and take his own chances. The example given by the
comments is of a spectator at a baseball game who may be regarded
as consenting to the risk of being hit by a ball.
Comment (c)(3) refers to the situation where the plaintiff, faced
with a dangerous condition created by the negligence of the
defendant, continues voluntarily to encounter the dangerous
condition. The example given is a contractor who continues to work
with a piece of machinery that he knows is in an unsafe condition.
The plaintiff may not be negligent in using the product if the risk is
relatively slight in comparison with the utility of his own conduct,
and he may even act with unusual caution because he is aware of the
danger. Nevertheless, recovery would be denied because he
expressly consents to the risk.
Comment (c)(4) describes the situation in which the plaintiff’s
conduct in voluntarily encountering a known risk is itself
unreasonable. Here, the plaintiff is barred by both his implied
consent to accept the risk, and by his contributory negligence.

3

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 496A cmt. c (1977).
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The following is illustrative of the distinction between assumption
of risk and contributory negligence.
[Defendant] is setting off dangerous fireworks in a public
place with reckless indifference to a serious risk of harm
to persons in the vicinity. [P1] and [P2] approach the
place where [defendant] is acting. [P1], fully aware of the
risk, approaches for the purpose of enjoying the spectacle.
[P2] is not aware of the risk, but in the exercise of
reasonable care for his own protection should discover or
appreciate it. [P1] and [P2] are injured by a rocket which
goes off at the wrong angle. [P1] is barred from recovery
against [the defendant] by his assumption of risk, but [P2]
is not barred from recovery for [the defendant’s] reckless
conduct by his contributory negligence.4
I. EXPRESS ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Section 496B of the Restatement of Torts (Second) defines express
assumption of risk: “[A] plaintiff who by contract or otherwise
expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant’s
negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such harm, unless
the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy.”
Parties generally may agree in advance that a defendant owes no
duty of care to a plaintiff.5 An express assumption of risk acts as a
complete bar to recovery in a negligence action.6 However, for a
4

Id. at cmt. d, illus. 1.
Barbazza v. Int’l Motor Sports Ass’n, Inc., 245 Ga. App. 790, 538 S.E.2d 859 (2000);
Lovelace v. Figure Salon, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 51, 345 S.E.2d 139 (1986); United States Auto
Club, Inc. v. Smith, 717 N.E.2d 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Werdehoff v. Gen. Star Indem.
Co., 229 Wis. 2d 489, 600 N.W.2d 214 (1999); LaFrenz v. Lake Cty. Fair Bd., 172 Ind.
App. 389, 360 N.E.2d 605 (1977); Winterstein v. Wilcom, 16 Md. App. 130, 293 A.2d 821
(1972).
6
Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court of S.D. Cty., 23 Cal. App. 4th 748, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177
(1993); Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, Inc., 226 Cal. App. 3d 758, 276 Cal. Rptr. 672
(1990); Day v. Fantastic Fitness, Inc., 190 Ga. App. 46, 378 S.E.2d 166 (1989); Masciola v.
Chi. Metro. Ski Council, 257 Ill. App. 3d 313, 628 N.E.2d 1067, 195 Ill. Dec. 603 (1993);
Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 519 N.E.2d 917, 116 Ill. Dec. 702 (1988); Barnes v. N.H.
Karting Ass’n, Inc., 128 N.H. 102, 509 A.2d 151 (1986); Kotovsky v. Ski Liberty Operating
5
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release to insulate a party from liability for his own negligent acts,
the parties must express their intent in clear, unambiguous, and
unequivocal language.7
While such releases are often enforceable, the law frowns upon
releases intended to exculpate a party from the consequences of his
own negligence, and therefore subjects them close to scrutiny.8 To
be enforceable, it must be perfectly clear from reading the release
that the limitation of liability extends to the negligence of the party
attempting to be relieved of a duty of care.9 The term “negligence”
or comparable language, generally, must appear in the writing.10
Moreover, a release will not exculpate a defendant from intentional,
grossly negligent, reckless, willful or wanton tortuous conduct.11
The New York Court of Appeals, in Gross v. Sweet,12 addressed
the issue of the general enforceability of releases. In Gross, plaintiff
enrolled in defendant’s parachute training school. Prior to his first
practice jump, plaintiff executed a release including the following
language:
I, the undersigned, hereby and by these covenants, do
waive any and all claims that I, my heirs, and/or assignees
may have against Nathaniel Sweet, the Stormville
Corp., 412 Pa. Super. 442, 603 A.2d 663 (1992).
7
Theis v. J & J Racing Promotions, 571 So. 2d 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Van Tuyn v.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); O’Connell v. Walt Disney
World Co., 413 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Paralift, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 748, 29
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177; Bennett v. United States Cycling Fed’n, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 239
Cal. Rptr. 55 (1987); Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Ctr., 168 Cal. App. 3d 333, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 194 (1985); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981); Masciola, 257 Ill. App. 3d at
313, 628 N.E.2d at 1067; Harris, 119 Ill. 2d at 542, 519 N.E.2d at 917.
8
Van Tuyn, 447 So. 2d at 318; O’Connell, 413 So. 2d at 444; Masciola, 257 Ill. App. 3d at
313, 628 N.E.2d at 1067; Harris, 119 Ill. 2d at 542, 519 N.E.2d at 917; Carbone v. Cortlandt
Realty Corp., 58 N.J. 366, 277 A.2d 542 (1971); Brown v. Racquetball Ctrs., Inc., 369 Pa.
Super. 13, 534 A.2d 842 (1987); Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 150 Vt. 373, 553 A.2d 143 (1988).
9
Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 166 Ariz. 183, 800 P.2d 1291 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990);
Brown v. Racquetball Ctrs., Inc., 369 Pa. Super. 13, 534 A.2d 842 (1987).
10
Macek v. Schooner’s, Inc., 224 Ill. App. 3d 103, 586 N.E.2d 442, 166 Ill. Dec. 484
(1991); Colgan, 150 Vt. at 373, 553 A.2d at 143.
11
Jones, 623 P.2d at 370; Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Ctr., Inc., 178 Ill. App.3d 597, 533
N.E.2d 941 (1989); Boucher v. Riner, 68 Md. App. 539, 514 A.2d 485 (1986).
12
49 N.Y.2d 102, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 400 N.E.2d 306 (1979).
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Parachute Center, the Jumpmaster, and the Pilot who shall
operate the aircraft when used for the purpose of
parachute jumping for any personal injuries or property
damage that I may sustain or which may arise out of my
learning, practicing or actually jumping from an aircraft. I
also assume full responsibility for any damage that I may
do or cause while participating in this sport.13
The Gross court explained that the intention of the parties must be
expressed in unmistakable language for an exculpatory clause to
insulate a party from liability for his own negligent acts.14 For a
release to be enforceable, it must be plainly and precisely apparent
that the limitation of liability extends to negligence or other fault of
the party attempting to shed his ordinary responsibility.15 Although
the term “negligence” need not be used, words conveying a similar
import must appear in the writing.16
In light of the strict standard of review, the court held that the
release as written was insufficient to exculpate the defendant from
liability. Its opaque terminology did not reveal that the plaintiff
released defendant from liability for injury that might result from
defendant’s failure to exercise due care.17 As a result, the release
merely could have emphasized that the defendant was not
responsible for injuries normally associated with skydiving occurring
without defendant’s fault. Consequently, the court affirmed the
order, reinstated the complaint and dismissed the release defense.
Other factors must also be considered in determining the
enforceability of a release. A release that exculpates a defendant
from liability for negligent acts may be declared void where disparity
13

Gross, 49 N.Y.2d at 110, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
Id. at 107, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (citing Willard Van Dyke Prods., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 304, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 339, 189 N.E.2d 693, 694 (1963) (requiring
absolutely clear language)); Coifalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 297, 220
N.Y.S.2d 962, 964, 177 N.E.2d 925, 926 (1961) (requiring sufficiently clear and
unequivocal language); Boll v. Sharpe & Dohme, 281 A.D. 568, 570-71, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20,
21-22 (1st Dept. 1953), aff’d, 307 N.Y. 646, 120 N.E.2d 836 (1954) (requiring clear and
explicit language).
15
Gross, 49 N.Y.2d at 107, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
16
Id. at 108, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
17
Id. at 109-10; 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369-70.
14
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in bargaining power of the parties would render enforcement
unconscionable.18 In addition, a release is void if it violates public
policy or contravenes a statute proscribing such agreement.19 For
example, in Gilkeson v. Five Mile Point Speedway, Inc., the plaintiff
purchased a ticket from the defendant for entry into an automobile
racetrack and paid an additional fee for specific entry into the pit
area. To gain access to the pit area, the plaintiff was required to sign
a “Release and Waiver of Liability Agreement.” Plaintiff signed the
agreement and indicated on the document that he was a member of
the pit crew for his friend who was racing. As plaintiff watched the
race, a collision occurred between two cars, and one of the cars lost
control, striking the plaintiff. Defendant moved for summary
judgment, alleging that plaintiff was barred from recovery because of
the release and waiver. The court denied the motion on two grounds.
First, under N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-326, any release and
waiver agreement is void as being against public policy if the owner
or operator of the facility receives a fee for the use of the facility.
Since the plaintiff had paid a fee for the ticket and an additional fee
for the pit admission, the release was void.20 However, even if there
was no statutory provision voiding the release, the court still would
have voided the release because of its wording. The court found that
the release made no reference to specific risks inherent in being a
18
See Jones, 623 P.2d at 370; Masciola, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 313, 628 N.E.2d at 1067;
Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971); Barnes, 128 N.H. at 102, 509
A.2d at 151; Allright, Inc. v. Elledge, 515 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1974);
19
See Bien v. Fox Meadow Farms, Ltd., 215 Ill. App. 3d 337, 574 N.E.2d 1311, 158 Ill.
Dec. 918 (1991); Garrison v. Combined Fitness Ctr., Ltd., 201 Ill. App. 3d 581, 559 N.E.2d
187 (1990); Harris, 119 Ill. 2d at 542, 519 N.E.2d at 917; LaFrenz, 172 Ind. App. at 389,
360 N.E.2d at 605; Barnes, 128 N.H. at 102, 509 A.2d at 151; Gilkeson v. Five Mile Point
Speedway Inc., 232 A.D.2d 960, 648 N.Y.S.2d 844 (3d Dept. 1996); Seaton v. E. Windsor
Speedway, Inc., 400 Pa. Super. 134, 582 A.2d 1380 (1990); Allright, Inc., 515 S.W.2d at
266; Crowell v. Hous. Auth., 495 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1973); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 34-722; IND. CODE § 22-3-10-1; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326; OKLA. STAT. TIT. 15, § 212.1.
20
The question of whether a plaintiff is a “user” of the facility and thus protected by statutes
similar to N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326 is the subject of much debate. If the plaintiff is
truly a spectator or a patron of the facility, such a statute will afford protection. See
Gilkeson, 232 A.D.2d 960, 648 N.Y.S.2d 844; Green v. WLS Promotions, Inc., 132 A.D.2d
521, 517 N.Y.S.2d 537 (2d Dept. 1987). But see Lux v. Cox, 32 F. Supp. 2d 92 (W.D.N.Y.
1998) (stating that a participant in high performance automobile driving school was not a
“user” of racetrack, but was student at racing school held at track); McDuffie v. Watkins
Glen Int’l, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 197 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding plaintiff was professional race
car driver and not “user”).
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spectator in the pit area, but merely referred to assuming the risk of
negligence of the defendant, which may cause injury or death. The
court concluded that plaintiff was not apprised of the risks involved
in the situation, and therefore could not be considered to have
assumed them.
Regarding minors, some courts21 have found, “[P]arents have the
authority to bind their minor children to exculpatory agreements. . . .
These agreements may not be disaffirmed by the child on whose
behalf they were executed.”22 In addition, some states have enacted
legislation that affects the enforceability of agreements purporting to
release a party from liability for fraud, willful injury or violation of
the law.23
The above discussion points out why the release and waiver
language typically appearing on the back of event tickets is
unenforceable. First, there is no signature required, making it
difficult to argue the existence of an agreement. Second, the ticket
holder may not read the provision, and thus may claim lack of notice.
Third, the printing is usually so small, it is not viewed as reasonable
notice. And fourth, the space on the back of the ticket is so limited,
it is impossible to print all the needed exculpatory language. The
same analysis would generally apply to signs or notices containing
exculpatory language displayed at event venues. Although the sign
may be large enough to contain the necessary exculpatory language,
it is not an express agreement. Patrons can always claim they never
saw it. However, there are statutes24 that require amusement park
operators to post signs advising patrons of certain statutory
21

Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 5 Fed. Appx. 450, 2001 WL 223852 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 456, (quoting Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 696 N.E.2d
201 (1998)).
23
E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1668 states: “All contracts which have for their object, directly or
indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the
person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against
the policy of the law.”
24
N.J. STAT. ANN. 5:3-57 (amusement parks). See N.J. STAT. ANN. 5:13-4 et seq.,
mandating by statute that “[a] skier is deemed to have knowledge of and to assume the
inherent risks of skiing” and N.J. STAT. ANN. 5:14-5 et seq., where the identical statutory
language mandates assumption of risk in roller-skating. Cases that analyze N.J. STAT. ANN.
5:13-4 (skiing) include Brough v. Hidden Valley, Inc., 312 N.J. Super. 139, 711 A.2d 382
(1998) and Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 279 N.J. Super. 306, 652 A.2d 774 (1994).
22
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requirements for completing accident reports on site as a condition
precedent to filing suit. That mandate charges a plaintiff with
assumption of risk in certain circumstances.
II. IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF RISK
A plaintiff may voluntarily enter a relationship with a defendant
that involves a known, potential risk of injury, and in so doing tacitly
consents to relieve the defendant of a duty of care otherwise owed to
the plaintiff. Many activities, notably sports and recreational
activities, have inherent risks of injury that cannot be eliminated by
the exercise of reasonable care.25 Therefore, courts often hold as a
matter of law that a plaintiff who voluntarily participates in a
sporting or recreational activity is owed no duty of care with respect
to the obvious risks associated with the activity.26 As Judge Cardozo
stated in these circumstances, “The timorous may stay at home.”27
Viewed from this “no duty” perspective, the assumption of risk
doctrine may act as a complete defense by negating the defendant’s
duty of care.28 Liability attaches, nonetheless, where the defendant
25

The primary assumption of risk doctrine has been employed in cases unrelated to sports
and recreation. See Baker v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 710, 181 Cal. Rptr. 311
(1982) (fireman’s rule); Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979) (fireman’s
rule); Chapman v. Craig, 431 N.W.2d 770 (Iowa 1988) (fireman’s rule); Howell v. Clyde,
533 Pa. 151, 620 A.2d 1107 (1993) (Flaherty, J.) (plaintiff injured by fireworks cannon).
26
See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 834 P.2d 696 (1992); Hammond
v. Bd. of Educ. of Carroll Cty., Md., 100 Md. App. 60, 639 A.2d 223 (1994); Martin v.
Buzan, 857 S.W.2d 366 (Mo. App. 1993); Howell v. Clyde, 533 Pa. 151, 620 A.2d 1107
(1993); Pestalozzi v. Phil. Flyers Ltd., 394 Pa. Super. 420, 576 A.2d 72 (1990); Johnson v.
Walker, 376 Pa. Super. 302, 545 A.2d 947 (1988); Bowser v. Hershey Baseball Ass’n, 357
Pa. Super. 435, 516 A.2d 61 (1986); Porter v. Miller, 13 Ohio App. 3d 93, 96 n.2, 468
N.E.2d 134 (1983); Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329
(1977) Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 641 A.2d 765 (Vt. 1994); Ridge v. Kladnick,
42 Wash. App. 785, 713 P.2d 1131 (1986); .
27
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929).
28
See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 834 P.2d 696 (1992); Ford v.
Gouin, 3 Cal. 4th 339, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30, 834 P.2d 724 (1992); Sprunger v. E. Noble
School Corp., 495 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d
343 (1979); Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Stanton v.
Miller, 66 Ohio App. 3d 201, 583 N.E.2d 1080 (1990); Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d
110, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983); Swagger v. City of Crystal, 379 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. App.
1985); Howell v. Clyde, 522 Pa. 151, 620 A.2d 1107 (1993).
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intentionally injures or engages in reckless, willful or wanton
misconduct beyond the scope ordinarily contemplated for the
activity.29 The doctrine is based on the public policy that one who
voluntarily takes a risk should not be permitted to recover money
damages from those who might otherwise have been liable.30
Additionally, imposing a duty of care upon participants of sport and
recreation would deter people from vigorous participation in such
activities.31
An example of the implied assumption of risk doctrine is Turcotte
v. Fell.32 Turcotte was a professional jockey whose career spanned
seventeen years. He was severely injured during a race when his
horse tripped over the heels of another horse, causing the jockey to
be thrown to the ground. Thereafter, Turcotte sued the owner and
jockey of the other horse, as well as the owner of the track, alleging
common law negligence and violation of state racing rules.
The court focused its attention on one essential element of
negligence—the duty to use reasonable care. In determining the
existence and scope of the duty, the court declared that the plaintiff’s
reasonable expectations of the care owed to him by others must be
29
See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 834 P.2d 696 (1992); Landrum v.
Gonzalez, 257 Ill. App. 3d 942, 629 N.E.2d 710 (1994); Sprunger v. E. Noble School Corp.,
495 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Gauvin v. Clark, 404 Mass. 450, 537 N.E.2d 94
(1989).
30
See Howell v. Clyde, 522 Pa. 151, 620 A.2d 1107 (1993).
31
See Ford v. Gouin, 3 Cal. 4th 339, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30, 834 P.2d 724 (1992) (Arabian, J.).
32
68 N.Y.2d 432, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49, 502 N.E.2d 964 (1986); In Maddox v. City of N.Y., 66
N.Y.2d 270, 496 N.Y.S.2d 726, 487 N.E.2d 553 (1985), a professional baseball player sued
the owner of the stadium for injuries sustained because of a wet outfield. The court
dismissed on the grounds of assumption of risk finding that the defect was open, obvious
and one of the generally accepted risks of baseball:
There is no question that the doctrine requires not only knowledge of the injurycausing defect but also appreciation of the resultant risk, but awareness of risk is
not to be determined in a vacuum. It is, rather, to be assessed against the
background of the skill and experience of the particular plaintiff, and in that
assessment a higher degree of awareness will be imputed to a professional than
one with less than professional experience in the particular sport.
Id. at 278, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 729-30, 487 N.E.2d at 557. “It is not necessary to the
application of assumption of risk that the injured plaintiff have foreseen the exact manner in
which his or her injury occurred, so long as he or she is aware of the potential for injury of
the mechanism from which the injury results.” Id. at 278, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 730, 487 N.E.2d
at 557.
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considered along with the wrongfulness of the defendant’s action or
inaction. This is especially true in professional sports, which involve
a greater degree of danger. Thus, the Turcotte court stated, “[I]f a
participant in a sporting event makes an informed estimate of the
risks involved in the activity and willingly undertakes them, then
there can be no liability if he is injured as a result of those risks.”33
Since New York’s comparative fault statute modified the
assumption of risk defense so that it no longer is an absolute defense,
the Turcotte court found it necessary to consider the risks assumed
by plaintiff when assessing a defendant’s duty of care.34
Accordingly, the court reasoned,
the analysis of care owed to plaintiff in the professional
sporting event by a co-participant and the proprietor of the
facility in which it takes place must be evaluated by
considering the risks plaintiff assumed when he elected to
participate in the event and how those assumed risks
qualified defendant’s duty to him.35
The risk assumed in this context means that the plaintiff, in
advance, has given his: “consent to relieve the defendant of an
obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury
from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave
undone.”36 Of course, a defendant who is relieved of his duty of care
cannot be charged with negligence.
With respect to sports and recreation, the inherent risks of these
activities were said to be incidental to a relationship of free
association between the defendant and the plaintiff in the sense that
either party is perfectly free to engage in the activity or not, as he
wishes.37 The defendant’s sole duty in these circumstances is to
exercise reasonable care to make the conditions as safe as they
33

Turcotte, 68 N.Y.2d at 437, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 52, 502 N.E.2d at 967.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 438, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 52-53 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS § 68, at 480-81
(5th ed.)).
37
Id. at 438, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
34
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appear to be.38
Where the risks of the activity are fully
comprehended or perfectly obvious, the plaintiff who engages in the
activity has consented to them, and the defendant has satisfied his
duty. Moreover, the court explained, a professional athlete is more
aware of the dangers of the activity, and presumably more willing to
accept them in exchange for a salary, than is an amateur.39
The dangers of speeding horses changing position and bumping
each other during a race were risks of which the plaintiff was fully
aware, and as such, the defendant jockey was relieved of his duty of
care. Further, the plaintiff was cognizant of the track conditions and
dangers associated with them. He had participated in three prior
races at the track on the day of the accident. He observed the track
conditions prior to his ill-fated race and he had experience riding
under those conditions. Therefore, the track owner was relieved of
the duty of care it owed to the plaintiff. In light of the foregoing, the
court affirmed summary judgment.
In 1994, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Crawn v. Campo,40
revived a discussion of the concept of assumption of risk. For over
twenty years, assumption of risk was largely banished from the
scene,41 in favor of the terminology of contributory negligence.
While not expressly reviving assumption of risk, the decision
discusses it in great length. Although the court adopted a
recklessness standard for sports cases, this standard’s application is
virtually identical to assumption of risk. Thanks to Crawn,42 the
philosophy behind the assumption of risk doctrine and its application
would no longer be a disfavored defense. In this case, a catcher in a
softball game sued a base runner that slid into him, causing knee
injuries. The trial court and both reviewing courts touched on
assumption of risk in their respective decisions. The intermediate

38

Id.
Turcotte, 68 N.Y.2d at 440, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
40
136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2d 600 (1994).
41
McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 276, 196 A.2d 238, 240 (1963).
42
Crawn, 136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2d 600.
43
266 N.J. Super. 599, 606, 630 A.2d 368, 372 (1993).
39

DRAGO.FINAL

594

2/15/02 2:59 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.12

appellate court noted that cases involving primary assumption of risk
should preferably be dealt with in terms of no duty:
[T]he Supreme Court . . . noted two distinct meanings of
assumption of risk: primary assumption of risk, an
alternate expression for the proposition that defendant was
not negligent, i.e., either owed no duty or did not breach
the duty owed and secondary assumption of risk . . . that
there is no reason to charge assumption of risk in its
secondary sense as something distinct from contributory
negligence.43
The primary holding of Crawn was fact-specific; that is, in the
case of participant against participant, the standard of care no longer
is negligence, but recklessness. The policy arguments in favor of
this change were to promote vigorous participation in athletic
activities and to avoid a flood of litigation. In upholding the
recklessness standard, the court philosophized:
One might well conclude that something is terribly wrong
with a society in which the most commonly-accepted
aspects of play—a traditional source of a community’s
conviviality and cohesion—spurs litigation. The
heightened
recklessness
standard
recognizes
a
commonsense distinction between excessively harmful
conduct and the more routine rough-and-tumble of sports
that should occur freely on the playing fields and should
not be second-guessed in courtrooms.44
After Crawn, other cases45 in New Jersey have been dismissed on
motion, based upon the assumption of risk/recklessness standard as

44

Crawn, 136 N.J. at 508, 643 A.2d at 607.
See, e.g., Norris v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. L-1453-93 (Middlesex Cty., N.J.,
Mar. 6, 1995). In Norris, the plaintiff suffered severe eye injuries during a lacrosse game
when she was hit in the eye by the ball. She sued alleging that the rules should have
required that she wear eye protection. The court held that the risk, which caused her injury,
was a known risk and dismissed her case. Id.
45
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articulated in Crawn. Moreover, in Schick v. Ferolito,46 the New
Jersey Supreme Court, in upholding the recklessness standard
espoused in Crawn, expanded its application from contact to
noncontact sports such as golf. “We perceive no persuasive reasons
to apply an artificial distinction between ‘contact’ and ‘noncontact’
sports.”47
In 1997, New York’s highest court decided four cases48 involving
the duty of care an owner or operator of an athletic facility owes to
participants injured on those premises while voluntarily engaged in
sports activities. In Morgan, the plaintiff sustained severe physical
injures as he was driving a two-person bobsled during a national
championship race near Lake Placid.
The plaintiff was an
experienced amateur bobsledder who had competed in the Olympics
and had been bobsledding at the same facility for over twenty years.
The plaintiff and his teammate completed their first run without
incident, and at the start of the second run, the bobsled tipped over
due to the plaintiff’s steering error. The teammate fell out, but the
plaintiff continued on the course, and since he could not reach the
brakes, the sled rode up on to the wall of the exit run where it went
through a twenty-foot opening in the wall and crashed into a concrete
abutment.
The plaintiff claimed negligence in the design of the course. The
trial court held the State liable for damages, but the appellate division
reversed and the court of appeals affirmed the reversal, finding that
there was no evidence that the opening of the wall engendered risks
beyond those inherent in a sport which involves streaking down a
mountainside on a sheet of ice at speeds approaching eighty miles
per hour. The accident was solely the result of dangers inherent in a
highly risky sport. While testimony showed that a slanted wall could
have been installed, evidence also showed that installing such a wall
might have been more dangerous to the competitors than the
operational configuration.
46

167 N.J. 7, 767 A.2d 962 (2001).
Id. at 18, 767 A.2d at 968.
48
Morgan v. State of N.Y., Beck v. Scimeca, Chimerine v. World Champion John Chung
Tae Kwon Do Inst., Siegel v. City of N.Y., 90 N.Y.2d 471, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d
202 (1997).
47

DRAGO.FINAL

596

2/15/02 2:59 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.12

In Beck, the plaintiff was injured while participating in class at
defendant’s karate school. The plaintiff, who was thirty years old,
had been a student at the school for fifteen months, attending two or
three classes a week. He was injured while attempting a “jump roll,”
a technique in which the student tumbles over an obstacle—one that
he had executed on prior occasions. On the day of the accident, the
instructor had left the classroom and placed in charge of the class, a
fifteen-year-old student who raised the height of the obstacle higher
than it had been for the plaintiff’s previous “jump rolls.” When the
plaintiff attempted the roll at the increased height, he landed
awkwardly and suffered a spinal injury. Both the appellate division
and the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the action. The
allegation that a student of superior skill (though youthful) was
placed in charge of the class does not, standing alone, warrant a trial.
The court found that it was indisputable that the plaintiff assumed the
risk of landing incorrectly. The fact that the barrier was set at a
higher level, a circumstance of which the plaintiff was keenly aware,
reinforced the finding that the risks involved were open and obvious.
In Chimerine, the plaintiff injured her knee while attempting a
kicking maneuver at a martial arts school. She claimed that because
she had only taken three classes, she did not understand the risks
inherent in martial arts training. The court found that a reasonable
person of participatory age or experience must be expected to know
that there is a risk of losing one’s balance when performing athletic
maneuvers.
In Siegel, the plaintiff was injured when he tripped playing tennis.
His foot snagged in the torn hem at the bottom of the net. His
deposition testimony showed that he had been a member of the club
for ten years, and that he had known for over two years that the sidedivider net was ripped, although he had never informed the facility
of the problem. The trial court dismissed the case, the appellate
division affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed and reinstated the
complaint. In this case the defendant argued that the torn net was an
inherent risk in the sport, and the plaintiff should have assumed the
risk of tripping. However, the court of appeals found as a matter of
law that a torn net, or any allegedly damaged or dangerous net, or
any other safety feature, is by its nature not automatically an inherent
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risk of the sport, for summary judgment purposes. Rather, it may
qualify as and constitute an allegedly negligent condition occurring
in the ordinary course of property maintenance.49
In Morgan, the court followed Judge Cardozo’s formulation of the
tort policy debate:50
One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers
that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary,
just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his
antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of
contact with the ball. . . . A different case would be here
if the dangers inherent in the sport were obscure or
unobserved, or so serious as to justify the belief that
precautions of some kind must have been taken to avert
them.51
The Morgan court acknowledged that with the abandonment of the
contributory negligence rule, the doctrine of assumption of risk
within the sports and entertainment context required reexamination
in light of the adoption of comparative negligence. Under this
reexamination, a facility owner or operator continues to owe a duty
of care to make the conditions at the facility as safe as they appear to
be. “If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly
obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has
performed its duty.”52
It is important to note that the assumption of risk doctrine applies
equally to the amateur or novice participant as it does to the
professional. “Correspondingly, for purposes of determining the
49

An interesting contrast to Siegel is Cevetillo v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 262 A.D.2d 517,
692 N.Y.S.2d 426 (2d Dept. 1999). In Cevetillo, plaintiff was injured playing tennis when
she tripped on a crack in the tennis court surface. The court held that Siegel was not
applicable because Siegel involved a defect in a safety device, and since Cevetillo involved
the actual sport surface, the plaintiff was held to have assumed the obvious risk. Id.; see
also Green v. City of N.Y., 263 A.D.2d 385, 693 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1st Dept. 1999).
50
Morgan, 90 N.Y.2d at 482, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 425, 685 N.E.2d at 206.
51
Id. (quoting Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. at 482-483, 166 N.E.
173).
52
Morgan, 90 N.Y.2d at 484, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 426, 685 N.E.2d at 207 (quoting Turcotte v.
Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 439, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49, 53, 502 N.E.2d 964, 968 (1986)).
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extent of the threshold duty of care, knowledge plays a role but
inherency is the sine qua non.”53 The lack of knowledge of the
plaintiff was critical in Baker v. Briarcliff School District.54 In
Baker, the sixteen-year-old plaintiff was injured while playing in a
varsity field hockey practice. She was injured when she was struck
in the mouth by a stick while she was not wearing her mouth
protector. Plaintiff testified that she did not recall the coach telling
her to wear her mouth protector that day, although she knew of the
requirement that it must be worn. The defendant moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that her failure to wear the
mouthpiece constituted assumption of risk. The trial court denied the
motion and the appellate division affirmed. The court found:
Students who voluntarily participate in extracurricular
sports assume the risks to which their role exposes them,
but not risks which have been unreasonably increased.
Thus, notwithstanding a player’s assumption of the risks
inherent in playing any sport, a school district remains
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect student
athletes involved in extracurricular sports from
unreasonably increased risks.5 5
Thus, the court found a question of fact as to whether the school
district unreasonably increased the risk of injury, and such a question
defeats summary judgment.
However, even if there is an unreasonable increase in the risk
presented, as long as that increased risk is open and obvious,
assumption of risk may apply. In Gilman v. Molly Fox Studios,
Inc.,56 the plaintiff was injured when she fell over a fellow classmate
in an aerobics class.
Plaintiff claimed that the class was
overcrowded and that the overcrowding caused the contact with the
classmate. The court held that even if the class were overcrowded,
53

Id. at 484, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 427, 685 N.E.2d at 208. Sine qua non is defined as follows:
“An indispensable condition or thing; something on which something else necessarily
depends.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1390 (7th ed. 1999).
54
205 A.D.2d 652, 613 N.Y.S.2d 660 (2d Dept. 1994).
55
Id. at 655, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
56
225 A.D.2d 404, 640 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dept. 1996).
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since plaintiff had attended ten previous classes that she claimed
were also overcrowded, by voluntarily participating in the class, she
consented to all the risks.
Assumption of risk as a defense is not limited to plaintiffs who are
true participants, but can also be applied to bystanders, spectators
and officials.57 Moreover, its application as a defense is not solely
limited to contact sports or to adults.58
In Wertheim v. United States Tennis Association,59 the assumption
of risk doctrine was applied where the plaintiff was not a true
participant. Tennis is not, of course, a contact sport. In Wertheim, a
tennis umpire was hit by a ball during a match, fell down, struck his
head and died. The theory of the plaintiff’s case was that the rule
requiring that line umpires stand in a “ready” position until the ball is
in play unreasonably increased the risk of injury. The court held that
as a matter of law, being hit by a tennis ball is surely a risk normally
associated with the sport, and therefore dismissed the complaint.
Another theory espoused by the plaintiff to circumvent the
assumption of risk defense was that the rule was reckless, thereby
invoking the “enhanced risk” doctrine.60 The court did not adopt this
theory, stating, “[w]e are of the opinion that if requiring the ready
position did enhance the risk of injury to umpires, the degree of
57
“Players, coaches, managers, referees and others who, in one way or another, voluntarily
participate must accept the risks to which their roles expose them.” Dillard v. Little League
Baseball Inc., 55 A.D.2d 477, 479, 390 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (4th Dept. 1977) (baseball
umpire); see also McGee v. Bd. of Educ., 16 A.D.2d 99, 226 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1st Dept. 1962)
(accounting teacher assigned as assistant baseball coach), Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice
Skating Ctr., Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 527, 777 A.2d 380 (2001) (spectator at amateur hockey
game).
58
While the types of vigorous and recreational activities for which assumption of risk may
be applicable are numerous, not all sporting activities will be subject to this defense. In
Shannon v. Rhodes, 92 Cal. App. 4th 792, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217 (2001), the infant plaintiff
was severely injured when she was thrown overboard during the recreational activity of
boating. The court held that the doctrine of assumption of the risk does not apply to bar the
claim of a passenger in a boat simply being used to ride around a lake. However, one can
imagine the opposite result if the boat was a cigarette boat and the passenger knew the
purpose of the ride was to display the boat’s performance.
59
150 A.D.2d 157, 540 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1st Dept. 1989), app. denied, 74 N.Y.2d 613, 547
N.Y.S.2d 846 (1989).
60
“Generally the enhanced risk doctrine in sports injury cases involves fact patterns where a
co-participant engages in reckless conduct causing injury to another participant.” Id. at 161,
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enhancement was marginal, and the actions of appellant in setting
this requirement did not rise to the level of recklessness.”61
Golf course cases pose interesting issues. One would assume that
being hit by an errant golf ball is an inherent risk of golfing.
However, some of the cases take a different twist. In Morgan v. Fuji
Country USA, Inc.,62 the plaintiff was hit on the head by an errant
golf ball. The golf course had trees between the fourth green and the
fifth tee. One of the pine trees shaded the fifth tee and a nearby cart
path. The plaintiff was a frequent player, and occasionally he
watched golf balls hit from the fourth tee fly over the pine tree and
land on either the fifth tee or the adjacent fifth green. For protection
from flying golf balls, the plaintiff would routinely stand underneath
this particular tree. The tree became diseased and was removed.
After it was removed, the plaintiff saw at least four golf balls hit
from the fourth tee almost strike golfers who were standing on the
fifth tee box. On the day of the accident, the plaintiff was hit as he
walked from the fifth tee box to his cart.
The trial court granted summary judgment, ruling primary
assumption of the risk completely barred the plaintiff’s claim. The
appellate court reversed. The defendant argued that being struck by
a golf ball is an inherent risk of the sport, and the appellate court
agreed. However, the court stated, “[B]efore concluding a case falls
within primary assumption of the risk it is not only necessary to
examine the nature of the sport but also ‘the defendant’s role in, or
relationship to, the sport.’”63 While property owners ordinarily are
required to use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions on their
property, some conditions on the property “that otherwise might be
viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the sport itself and
a property owner has no duty to remove them.”64 For example,
“although moguls on a ski run pose a risk of harm to skiers that
might not exist were these configurations removed, the challenge and
540 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
61
Id.
62
34 Cal. App. 4th 127, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249 (1995).
63
Id. at 133, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252 (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 317, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 2, 43 (1992)).
64
Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 315, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 14 (1992).
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risks posed by the moguls are part of the sport of skiing, and a ski
resort has no duty to eliminate them.”65
However, a ski resort does have a duty to maintain its safety
equipment in working condition, “so as not to expose skiers to an
increased risk of harm”66 because this “type of risk, posed by a ski
resort’s negligence, clearly is not a risk that is assumed by a
participant.”67 Similarly, the golf course must be designed and
operated so as to present a playing field that does not offer risks
greater than one would expect. Under the facts of Morgan, summary
judgment was not warranted because evidence could support a
finding that the defendant breached the duty of care owed to the
plaintiff.68
Contrast Morgan with Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area,69
wherein the plaintiff, who considered himself an expert skier,
collided with a ski lift tower on a difficult run. The plaintiff’s
bindings released unexpectedly and he collided with the tower that
was visible for at least 200 yards before impact. The theory of
liability was that padding on the tower was inadequate. The case
was dismissed on assumption of risk grounds, because the ski area
had acted reasonably in providing some padding of the tower, and
contact with a padded tower was found to be an inherent risk of
skiing.
How does one reconcile the differing results in Morgan and
Connelly? In Morgan, the club changed the course design by
removing the tree, thereby creating a question of fact as to whether
the risk of injury was enhanced. In Connelly, the tower and its
condition were static, thereby not affording the plaintiff the argument
that the risk of injury was increased.

65

Id.
Id. at 316, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
67
Id.
68
See Hawkes v. Catatonk Golf Club Inc., 732 N.Y.S.2d 132 (3d Dept. 2001), for another
example of a golf course case wherein the design of the course and the knowledge of the
owner regarding errant balls in the parking lot created a question of fact, negating the
assumption of risk defense for summary judgment purposes.
69
39 Cal. App. 4th 8, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (1995).
66
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Now, contrast Morgan with Hornstein v. State of New York,70
wherein the plaintiff was struck in the eye by a golf ball while
waiting to tee off. Plaintiff “failed to prove . . . that the proximity of
the holes in question constituted a trap or inherently dangerous
condition, or that the defendant had created a hazardous condition
which it was under a legal duty to remedy.”71
It is axiomatic that for the defense to be successful, the plaintiff
must be engaged in the athletic or recreational activity at the time of
the injury, and remoteness will be fatal to the defense.72
It will be instructive to look at this doctrine in the context of
minors. A prime example of the accommodation given minors and
near-minors by some courts is found in Benitez v. New York City
Board of Education.73 The nineteen-year-old plaintiff was a star
football player on a high school team that all parties agreed was
undersized and overmatched when compared to its rivals. Indeed,
the principal of the plaintiff’s school requested that the team be
dropped to a lower division for fear of injury to the players. The
team was not lowered to a different division, and the plaintiff
suffered severe injuries while making a tackle. The plaintiff claimed
his team was outmatched and outsized, and that the defendant was
negligent by unreasonably increasing the risk of his being injured by
allowing the mismatch. He also claimed that at the time of the
injury, he had played almost the entire game and was tired. In a
three-to-one decision, the court decided that since the plaintiff was a
student, his participation was not entirely voluntary, based upon a
“degree of indirect compulsion.”74 Also, the court stated that the
defendant unreasonably enhanced the risk of injury by allowing a
70

46 Misc. 2d 486, 259 N.Y.S.2d 902, aff’d, 30 A.D.2d 1012, 294 N.Y.S.2d 320 (3d Dept.
1968).
71
Id. at 488, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 902; see also Lundin v. Town of Islip, 207 A.D.2d 778, 616
N.Y.S.2d 394 (2d Dept. 1994).
72
See Vogel v. Venetz, 278 A.D.2d 489, 718 N.Y.S.2d 396 (2d Dept. 2000), wherein the
plaintiff was injured while loading his snowmobile onto a trailer in a motel parking lot in
preparation for riding on locally designated trails. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff
was engaged in a sports activity at the time of his accident and that he assumed the risks
inherent therein. The court held that plaintiff’s injury was not caused by an inherent danger
associated with snowmobiling.
73
141 A.D.2d 457, 530 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dept. 1988).
74
Id. at 461, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
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Therefore, no assumption of risk

The dissent discussed that the plaintiff was accustomed to playing
the entire game, and argued that fatigue is not an increased risk of
football, but rather is one of the inherent risks of football. Also, the
dissent argued that the indirect compulsion found by the majority
was not sufficient to find that the plaintiff was not voluntarily
engaging in the game. The dissent would have dismissed the
complaint on the grounds of assumption of risk.
The findings of the Benitez dissent were adopted in Edelson v.
Uniondale Free School District.75 In Edelson, the plaintiff was
participating in a high school wrestling match against an opponent
who was in a weight classification one category higher than his own.
The plaintiff’s primary theory of negligence was that it was
unreasonable to allow him to wrestle someone in a higher weight
class. The court found that the risk that caused the injury was
reasonably foreseeable in wrestling, and was not caused by the size
of the opponent. Since the risks were not concealed or unreasonably
increased, dismissal was appropriate.
Another result contrary to Benitez is found in Burke v. East
Brunswick Township Board of Education.76 In Burke, the eighthgrade plaintiff sued the school district for injuries received when he
was tackled during a football game. He argued that the defendant
was negligent in permitting a mismatched contest with the other
school team, whose players were of greater size, age, strength, speed
and skill. The appellate division affirmed the trial court’s dismissal,
holding that school districts have no legal duty to match opposing
interscholastic teams with players of equal or uniform size, speed,
skill or age.
Generally courts have held that minors can assume the risk, but
only if they have the capacity to appreciate the dangers presented. In
Abee v. Stone Mountain Memorial Association,77 the eleven-year-old
plaintiff was injured while riding on a water slide. At his deposition,
75

219 A.D.2d 614, 631 N.Y.S.2d 391 (2d Dept. 1995).
N.J. App. Div. 31-2-8311 (Oct. 5, 2001).
77
312 S.E.2d 142 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983), aff’d, 314 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. 1984).
76
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he testified that he appreciated the dangers presented by the slide,
and indeed he continued on the slide despite this appreciation. The
court held that assumption of risk was an appropriate defense and
dismissed.
III. CONFUSION OF THE DEFENSES
Many courts refer to primary assumption of risk and secondary
assumption of risk, while others distinguish between express and
implied. Others confuse primary and secondary assumption of risk.
Indeed, comment (c) to the Restatement of Torts (Second) states,
“[a]ssumption of risk is a term which has been surrounded by much
confusion, because it has been used by courts in at least four
different senses, and the distinctions seldom have been made clear.”
Some courts define as secondary assumption of risk when the
plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known and appreciated risk of
injury created by defendant’s negligence.78 Unlike its primary form,
a plaintiff in the secondary assumption of risk context has not
impliedly consented to relieve the defendant of a duty of care.79
Secondary assumption of risk is not a complete defense, but has been
merged with the defense of contributory negligence under
comparative fault laws.80
When the plaintiff’s decision to encounter risk is unreasonable,
secondary assumption of risk is tantamount to contributory
negligence, and the plaintiff’s claim should be submitted to the jury
78

See Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club, 16 Cal. App. 4th 817, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270 (1993);
Benefiel v. Walker, 244 Va. 488, 422 S.E.2d 773 (1992); Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296,
11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 834 P.2d 696 (1992); Wagner v. Thomas J. Obert Enters., 396 N.W.2d
223 (Minn. 1986); Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979); Thompson v.
Ruidoso-Sunland, Inc., 105 N.M. 487, 734 P.2d 267 (1987); Mignone v. Fieldcrest Mills,
556 A.2d 35 (R.I. 1989).
79
See Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club, 16 Cal. App. 4th 817, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270 (1993);
Baber v. Dill, 510 N.W.2d 228 (Minn. App. 1994); Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343
(Minn. 1979).
80
Bush v. Parents Without Partners, 17 Cal. App. 4th 322, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178 (1993);
Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 834 P.2d 696 (1992); Springrose v.
Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Mima v. City of Akron, 31 Ohio App. 3d
124, 508 N.E.2d 974 (1986); Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780
(1983); Ridge v. Kladnick, 42 Wash. App. 785, 713 P.2d 1131 (1986).
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for analysis under comparative fault principles.81 However, if the
plaintiff’s decision to encounter the risk is reasonable, the court is
faced with a dilemma: Should this type of assumption of risk: (1)
completely bar recovery; (2) be evaluated under comparative fault
principles; or (3) be abolished as a defense?
Courts are split on the issue. There is authority in favor of
retaining this type of assumption of risk as a complete defense.82
Nevertheless, some courts have concluded that a plaintiff’s
assumption of risk, irrespective of reasonableness, should be factored
into the comparative fault computation.83 Still other courts have held
that this type of assumption of risk is not a defense at all.84 Reasons
advanced for this extreme position include: (1) it would be
anomalous to deny recovery to a plaintiff who acted reasonably
while permitting partial recovery to a plaintiff who acted
unreasonably; and (2) this type of assumption of risk inequitably
punishes reasonable conduct.85
The distinction between primary and secondary assumption of risk
is exemplified by Collier v. Northland Swim Club.86 Plaintiff Collier
was an eleven-year-old girl who was seriously injured when she
struck her head on the bottom of an in-ground swimming pool during
diving practice. The plaintiff was an experienced swimmer who had
used the pool for several years prior to the accident. She had known
the water was only three-and-one-half feet deep, a depth which was
clearly marked at the side of the pool. Nevertheless, she sued the
81
See Mazzeo v. City of Sebastian, 550 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1989); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348
So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club, 135 Ill. App. 3d 429, 481 N.E.2d
1037, 90 Ill. Dec. 237 (1985); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1994); Silcox v.
Coffee, 1993 WL 350134 (Tenn. App. 1993); ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Puget Sound Freight
Lines, 44 Wash. App. 368, 722 P.2d 1310 (1986).
82
See Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1983); Keegan v. Anchor
Inns, Inc., 606 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. (Virgin Islands) 1979); Scoggins v. Jude, 419 A.2d 999
(D.C. 1980); Braswell v. Econ. Supply Co., 281 So. 2d 669 (Miss. 1973); Howell v. Clyde,
533 Pa. 151, 620 A.2d 1107 (1993) (Flaherty, J.).
83
See, e.g., Mizushima v. Sunset Ranch, Inc., 103 Nev. 259, 737 P.2d 1158 (1987).
84
Rini, 861 F.2d at 502; Segoviano v. Housing Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 191 Cal. Rptr.
578 (1983); Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 287; ITT Rayonier, Inc., 44 Wash. App. 368, 722 P.2d
at 1310.
85
See Rini, 861 F.2d at 502; see also Segoviano, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 162, 191 Cal. Rptr. at
578.
86
35 Ohio App. 3d 35, 518 N.E.2d 1226 (1987).
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pool club alleging negligent failure to warn and inadequate
supervision. Defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial
court granted the motion based on the primary assumption of risk
doctrine.
On appeal, the court found that the lower court confused the
primary and secondary assumption of risk doctrines. The court ruled
that under primary assumption of risk, a defendant owes no duty to a
plaintiff as a matter of law, because the risks of some activities are so
inherent that they cannot be eliminated. The doctrine rests on the
fiction that a plaintiff has tacitly consented to the risk, thereby
relieving the defendant of any duty.
The Collier court continued by stating that secondary assumption
of risk occurs when a plaintiff consents or acquiesces in an
appreciated, known or obvious risk to plaintiff’s safety. This variety
of assumption of risk includes those situations in which the risk is so
obvious that the plaintiff must have known and appreciated the
risk.87 Unlike its primary form, the defendant owes a duty to the
plaintiff, and factual questions concerning the plaintiff’s
acquiescence in, or appreciation of, a known risk generally are
reserved for a jury.
The lower court stated, as a matter of law, that primary assumption
of risk occurs: (1) when defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff; or
(2) when the risk of harm is so obviously within the common
knowledge that the defendant is relieved of any duty that exists.88
Because the second part of this definition relates to secondary
assumption of risk, the lower court erroneously blurred the
distinction between primary and secondary forms of the defense.
The Collier court identified two reasons to support the distinction
between the two doctrines. First is the rationale behind primary
assumption of risk: the risk of injury associated with the activity is
so inherent that it is unavoidable. Although the possibility of injury
from diving into a shallow pool exists, the court determined that the

87
88

Id. at 37, 518 N.E.2d at 1228.
Id.
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risk is not so inherent as to alleviate pool operators of any duty to all
divers:
A rule stating that the risk is inherent would imply that all
divers know of and accept the risk, regardless of whether
the dive is their first or fifty-first. We cannot believe that
such a rule attends aquatic activities as it does baseball
games.
Rather, proper instruction, warnings and
supervision on diving can, and do, minimize the risk.89
Next, secondary assumption of risk is a voluntary
acknowledgement that the potential exists for injury rather than a
consent to suffer any injury.90 Thus, the secondary form of the
defense resembles contributory negligence more than primary
assumption of risk. The evidence in the Collier case failed to show
that the plaintiff was aware of the risks of diving, which would have
relieved the defendant of its duty of care. Instead, the evidence
suggested that the plaintiff was careless in diving, and did not agree
to accept the risk of injury.
In sum, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s conduct may have
amounted to secondary assumption of risk, which must be evaluated
by the jury under the state’s comparative negligence statute.
Accordingly, the lower court’s ruling was reversed, and the matter
remanded for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
It is not always easy to identify whether an activity is subject to
primary assumption of risk rather than secondary or express rather
than implied. Is the risk of injury from horseback riding lessons so
inherent as to be unavoidable? Can the risks be minimized by
warnings, instruction or supervision? What about the risk of a fan
being hit with a puck, or being crushed by a basketball player diving
for a loose ball or by a baseball catcher diving for a foul ball?
89
90

Id. at 37, 518 N.E.2d at 1229.
Id.
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Courts generally allow a defendant to avoid liability in sports or
recreational cases if the plaintiff has expressly relieved the defendant
of liability (by release and waiver), or if the injury was caused by a
risk inherent in the activity. Regardless of what moniker is used to
identify the defense (express, implied, primary, secondary, etc.), the
rationale is the same. In its future application, the defense of
assumption of risk is only limited by our ability to devise new ways
to entertain ourselves, either through sports or recreational activities.
In addition, the defense may be wielded against claims that are
sports-related but not the result of athletic competition. The recent
wrongful death suit91 filed by the estate of Minnesota Vikings
lineman Korey Stringer alleges that the defendants compelled him to
practice in hot and humid conditions, despite health concerns raised
during the previous days training, and that his weakened medical
condition ultimately caused his death. Can the defendants assert
assumption of risk? As a professional athlete, did the decedent have
the requisite knowledge that his continuing to practice increased the
likelihood of injury? Did the decedent have the ability to remove
himself from practice if he felt ill, or if he believed the weather
conditions increased the chance of a medical emergency? Are severe
medical afflictions—and even death—risks that are inherent in the
violent and intense world of professional football? Were those risks
increased by the actions or inactions of the defendants? All valid
questions, the answers to which must await the course of litigation.
Volenti Non Fit Injuria92

91

Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, L.L.C., File #02-415, Hennepin Cty. Dist. Ct.,
4th Jud. Dist. (filed Jan. 16, 2002).
92
Justice Cardozo, quoted from Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., Inc., 250 N.Y.
479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929), translated into English as, “A person cannot be harmed by that to
which he or she consents.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 657 (pocket ed. 1996).

